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Abstract This paper is concerned with the extent to which rehabilitation
tax credits affect the conditional probability of commercial real
estate rehabilitation. The analysis suggests that rehabilitation tax
credits have been a signiﬁcant determinant of the conditional
probability of rehabilitation in the Boston ofﬁce market. A
signiﬁcant portion of rehabilitation tax credit investment is
investment that would have been invested elsewhere, about 60%
to 65% in certain periods, but rising to as high as 90% in other
periods. The ﬁndings indicate that the rehabilitation tax credit
has a signiﬁcant and substantial inﬂuence on the conditional
probability of rehabilitation. The ﬁndings also reveal that the
greatest amount of slippage, not too surprisingly, generally
occurs when the tax credit is low and when the gain from
rehabilitation before the tax credit is high.
Relatively little has been written about the rehabilitation tax credit, even though
it has been a feature of the tax code in the United States 1978. After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86), the rehabilitation tax credit was applied to
industrial, commercial, and other income-producing buildings (factories, retail
stores, hotels, and motels) built and originally placed in service before 1936.1 The
amount of the rehabilitation tax credit varies with the age and use of the structure.
The credit is allowed for all recognized expenditures provided the expenses are
substantial. The primary motivation for the rehabilitation tax credit is to favor the
rehabilitation of older, more centrally located buildings that are already served by
an existing infrastructure of streets, utilities, and civic buildings as against the
construction of new buildings at the urban fringe.
This research uses data from a panel survey of the Boston ofﬁce market to examine
the effectiveness of the rehabilitation tax credit. Past analyses directed at
ascertaining the effectiveness of tax credits have produced mixed results.2 Clark
(1979) and Hendershott and Hu (1981), for example, use time series observations
of equipment investment and the cost of capital to uncover the relationship322  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
between tax credits and the level of investment. Their results show only modest
effects of investment subsidies. Auerbach and Hassett (1991) use an event-study
methodology to examine the effectiveness of investment subsidies. Their ﬁndings
suggest no statistical relationship between investment spending and changes in the
investment tax credit. Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994), on the other hand,
using cross-sectional responses to tax law changes to identify exogenous shocks
to ﬁrms’ investment conditions, ﬁnd that tax policy has a signiﬁcant and large
effect on investment.
The techniques used in this paper are inspired by the literature on failure time
models (e.g., Cox, 1972; and Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 1980). The empirical model
relates the conditional probability of rehabilitation to the value of the rehabilitation
tax credit and other characteristics. The model is used to forecast the rate of
rehabilitation with and without the rehabilitation tax credit. This empirical
approach has several advantages. First, it makes possible a much clearer
comparison of the relative effects of different factors on the decision to
rehabilitate. Second, it permits the use of right-censored data (unrehabilitated
properties). And third, it avoids certain econometric problems—aggregation and
simultaneity bias—that plague the past literature.3
The paper proceeds as follows. First, a simple model of the rehabilitation decision
for the conditional probability of rehabilitation is presented, which can be derived
as a function of the gain from renovation, including the rehabilitation tax credit.
The greater the gain from renovation before the rehabilitation tax credit, the
greater the conditional probability of rehabilitation, all else held equal. In addition,
tax credits can have a signiﬁcant effect on the conditional probability of
rehabilitation. After a brief discussion of the empirical methodology, the
endogenous variables used in the model, and the data series to be used in this
paper, a failure time model of the conditional probability of rehabilitation is
estimated. As will become clear, there is a formal similarity between failure time
models and the empirical work of Clark (1979) and Hendershott and Hu (1981).
This occurs because of the negative slope of the marginal revenue curve. As the
marginal cost curve shifts downward with a higher level of tax credit, the
equilibrium level of rehabilitation must therefore increase for each structure
previously and currently feasible for rehabilitation. Any structures newly feasible
for rehabilitation would of course simply add additional expenditures, resulting in
a monotonic relationship between the probability of rehabilitation and the level of
rehabilitation expenditures.
The model is used to forecast the number of eligible buildings that would have
been rehabilitated in the absence of the tax credit. To measure the degree of
slippage associated with the rehabilitation tax credit, the fraction of eligible
buildings that would have been rehabilitated even without the tax credit is
computed. An ernest attempt is made to control for the net (before tax) ﬁnancial
incentives to rehabilitate a building before attempting to determine whether
changes in the rehabilitation tax credit explain changes in rehabilitation activity.Tax Credits and the Boston Office Market  323
JRER  Vol. 28  No. 4 – 2006
The ﬁndings clearly suggest that rehabilitation tax credits are a signiﬁcant
determinant of both the conditional and unconditional probabilities of
rehabilitation. The ﬁndings also suggest that a signiﬁcant portion of rehabilitation
tax-credit investment spending is spending that would have been invested
otherwise, about 60% to 65% in certain periods, but rising to as high as 90% in
other periods. The greatest amount of slippage, not too surprisingly, generally
occurs when the tax credit is low and when the gain from rehabilitation before
the tax credit is high.
 Theory
Assume that the ofﬁce market consists of n identical properties with an age
distribution of ƒ(a) and ages (a0( 0), a1, a2,...,an) in period t  0. Owners
at any period t  0 must decide whether or not to rehabilitate their structures and
the extent of rehabilitation. The decision to rehabilitate occurs when the marginal
revenue, MR, from rehabilitation is expected to be greater than the marginal cost,
MC. Here, marginal revenue consists of the expected increase in rental revenues
plus the increased sales price at reversion, discounted at the appropriate discount
rate. Marginal costs include the costs of rehabilitation incurred in period t, less
any reduction in operating costs over time, plus any increment (or less any
decrement) in costs associated with sale at reversion, again discounted at the
appropriate discount rate.
Also included in the marginal cost is the value of the rehabilitation timing option.
This option value is equal to the opportunity cost of investing now instead of
waiting. Deﬁne MC as the marginal cost of investing now (excluding the value
of the option to postpone rehabilitation). Deﬁne V as the value of the rehabilitation
timing option. As is well established in the real options literature (see Titman,
1985; Childs, Riddiough, and Triantis, 1996; Trigeorgis, 1996; Williams, 1997;
and Moore, 2001), V depends on the risk-free rate and the volatility in rents. As
the risk-free rate increases, V increases because the expenditure is delayed and
interest is earned. Similarly, the option to invest provides insurance against
declines in the value of the project, and so as the volatility in rents increases,
deferring investment is more valuable. Furthermore, because the volatility in rents
is likely to be a function of structure age, V should increase with structure age,
assuming the volatility of rents does so.
Further, assume that a tax credit at rate h is allowed on rehabilitation
expenditures. For convenience, also assume the marginal cost of rehabilitation is
invariant with respect to the degree of rehabilitation for structures of all vintages
over the range of analysis. The baseline marginal cost in the absence of a tax
credit is given by MC0  MC  V, MC1 and MC2 then represent the marginal
cost of rehabilitation when more generous rehabilitation tax credits are allowed.
More speciﬁcally, MC1 is deﬁned by MC1  (1  1)MC  V and MC2 is deﬁned
by MC2  (1  2) MC  V, where 2  1.324  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
Exhibit 1  Optimal Rehabilitation Under Alternative Tax Credit Regimes
Now consider the marginal revenue from rehabilitation. Marginal revenue should
vary signiﬁcantly for structures of different vintages. This is depicted in Exhibit
1 for three different structures: new, middle-aged, and older structures, where the
vertical axis represents the marginal cost or revenue from rehabilitation and the
horizontal axis represents the degree of rehabilitation in units of physical stock or
services per unit time. In Exhibit 1, any age ai greater than a0 yields a higher
MRi. Notice that, because the marginal revenue curve MR0 for newly built
structures is below the marginal cost curve except for the extreme case of MC2,
owners will not rehabilitate new structures under any but the most extreme tax
credit scenarios. It is also important to note that, even in the case of an extremely
high tax credit, the equilibrium level of rehabilitation for a new structure, q*02,i s
quite low.
For mid-life structures, the marginal revenue curve is given by MR1. Here again,
the value of MR1 is such that no mid-life structure would be rehabilitated under
a tax scenario of zero tax credit. However, under a moderate tax credit regime
represented by the marginal cost curve MC1, rehabilitation would take place up
to the point q*11. It can also be seen that a deeper tax credit results in a higher
equilibrium level of rehabilitation (i.e., at q*12 rather than q*11). With regard to
older structures, the curve in Exhibit 1 labeled MR2 shows that, in the absence of
a tax credit, it is proﬁtable to rehabilitate older structures up to the level q*20.
Note that the result of increasing the tax credit in this case is simply to raise theTax Credits and the Boston Office Market  325
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Exhibit 2  Aggregate Survival Curves Under Alternative Tax Credit Regimes
level of rehabilitation expenditures. With a moderate rehabilitation tax credit, for
example, rehabilitation will occur up to the point q*21. Meanwhile, the presence
of an extreme tax credit serves to increase the equilibrium level of rehabilitation
to q*22.
This analysis clearly shows that the degree of investment and slippage is
dependent on both the depth of the tax credit and the distribution of structure
ages. In the simple case where there are just the three structures shown in Exhibit
1, and where there is a moderate tax credit on all rehabilitation expenditures, the
proportion of rehabilitation tax-credit investment spending (in physical units) that
is spending that would have been invested otherwise (or slippage) is q*20/(q*21 
q*11). In the high tax credit case, the degree of slippage is q*20/(q*22  q*12 
q*02). Since q*20/(q*22  q*12  q*02)  q*20/(q*21  q*11), or equivalently q*22
 q*12  q*02  q*21  q*11, it is suggested that rehabilitation tax-credit-induced
investment spending increases as the rehabilitation tax credit increases, all else
held constant. Obviously, a higher proportion of buildings rendered feasible for
rehabilitation results in greater incremental private investment, hence a lower
degree of slippage, ceteris paribus.4
Now consider Exhibit 2, which represents the percentage ‘‘survival’’ of
unrehabilitated buildings as a function of time t since the implementation of the
historic rehabilitation tax credit. At each period, building owners go through the
above rehabilitation calculus, given their building’s age, current market conditions,
their expectations about the future, and the current tax credit rule. A certain326  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
proportion (t) of the original universe of owners decides to rehabilitate, leaving
behind S(t)  1  (t) unrehabilitated structures (i.e., the ‘‘survivors’’). In period
t  1, the remaining population of buildings has aged one period. The marginal
revenue curves shift accordingly, perhaps bringing additional structures into the
range of feasibility for rehabilitation. Over time, a cohort survival curve is
generated that is unique to each tax credit regime.5 Note that the ‘‘no credit’’
regime would be expected to result in the highest rate of survivability of non-
rehabilitated structures and vice versa for the high-credit regime. Note also that
the vertical and horizontal differences between the survival curves graphed in
Exhibit 2 depend on the distribution of buildings across vintages. This implies
that the pattern of rehabilitation observed over time under a given tax credit regime
will be dependent on the vintage distribution.
 Econometric Methodology
The goal of the empirical analysis is to examine the effects of tax credits on the
rehabilitation of the Boston ofﬁce market. In the spirit of the notion of survivorship
developed in the last section, the methodology employed follows that of Cox
(1972). The Cox hazard model determines both the conditional probability of
rehabilitation at time period t that would be appropriate under neutral economic
conditions (which is commonly referred to as the ‘‘baseline hazard rate’’), (t)
and the conditional probability of rehabilitation relative to this baseline as tax
policy and economic conditions change. The model builds in the assumption that
if a variable increases the likelihood of rehabilitation, it also decreases the time
to rehabilitation.
A Weibull distributional form is used for the hazard function, which allows for
any monotonic effect. The baseline hazard is given by the following:
p1 (t)  p (t) (1)
and the hazard function relative to this baseline hazard rate is:
(xt; t)  (t) exp(    ...    ) (2) 1x1t 1x1t 1x1tz t
where:
zt  The gain from rehabilitation before the rehabilitation tax credit;
xt  (x1t, x2t,...,xnt) is a vector of contemporaneous characteristics of the
property and the market (including tax policy);
 and p  Parameters of the Weibull distribution;Tax Credits and the Boston Office Market  327
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  (1, 2,...,n) indicates the direction and magnitude of the effect
of xt  (x1t, x2t,...,xnt) on the conditional probability of rehabilitation;
and
  The coefﬁcient of the gain from rehabilitation variable.
The baseline hazard rate in Equation (1) is a simple generalization of the
exponential distribution. For p  1, the baseline hazard rate is monotone
decreasing with respect to time; for p  1, the baseline hazard rate is increasing
with respect to time; and for p  1, the baseline hazard rate remains constant as
time increases. The latter is the exponential case.6
Several comments about (t), (t; xt), and xt  (x1t,x 2t,...,xnt) are worthy of
attention. First, both (t) and (t; xt) are conditional probabilities [i.e., (t) and
(t; xt) refer to the probability of rehabilitating a property in period t given that
the property has not been previously rehabilitated]. Second, the baseline hazard
rate, (t), is the probability that rehabilitation will take place under completely
stationary, homogeneous conditions. The Weibull distribution is used because it
is generally expected that the ofﬁce building rehabilitation time distribution will
be monotonic (see below). Other distributions, such as the lognormal or log-
logistic distribution, assume that the hazard function should ﬁrst increase and then
decrease.7 Third, the covariates in Equation (2) act multiplicatively on the baseline
rate. Fourth, values of xt  (x1t, x2t,...,xnt) are allowed to vary over time. This
means that the integrated hazard, survivor, and density functions will, in general,
depend on the entire time path (up to t) of the regressor and that the estimation
of   (1, 2,...,n) will require numerical maximization of the log-likelihood
function.
Let Rrt and Rut be the rehabilitated and unrehabilitated property rents for building
i at time t and let 	t be the cost of renovation (measured as a percentage of original
value). Building i will otherwise be rehabilitated (ignoring the effects of the
rehabilitation tax credit) if:
z  log(R /R )  	. (3) tr t u t t
i.e., building i will be rehabilitated if zt, the percentage property rent differential,
exceeds the cost of renovation.
New properties are expected to possess relatively little economic incentive for
rehabilitation (i.e., zt should be close to zero or possibly negative, and zt  	t 
0). Ceteris paribus, zt would then be expected to be monotonically related to age
of the structure, starting off low for ‘‘young’’ buildings and gradually increasing
to within a feasible range for ‘‘middle-aged’’ buildings that are ripe for
rehabilitation. Older buildings that have been rehabilitated are assigned a new
‘‘effective age,’’ deﬁned as the time since rehabilitation, and zt is reset to a lower
level consistent with newer buildings. Those older buildings that have somehow328  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
escaped rehabilitation (consistent with the notion of market inefﬁciencies) would
experience continuously higher (‘‘supernormal’’) levels of zt.
A difﬁculty in estimating zt is that while the actual property rent for each building
is observed in the sample, the would-be rent on the building had rehabilitation
occurred or not occurred (as the case may be) is unknown. As a result, zt is
unobservable. To estimate zt, two hedonic rent equations are speciﬁed: one rent
equation for rehabilitated properties and one for unrehabilitated properties. These
are:
log R  yB  
 (4) ri i r i
log R  yB   (5) ui i u i
where yi is a vector of amenities and other characteristics explaining the
determination of rental rates, Br and Bu are coefﬁcient vectors, and 
i and i are
normal error terms. Market asking rents per square foot are the dependent
variables in Equations (4) and (5). The explanatory variables include building size,
number of ﬂoors, property vacancy rate,8 building age, and locational submarket.
For each rehabilitated property, the value of zt is then set equal to the logarithm
of the ratio of actual to predicted unrehabilitated rents, where the latter is obtained
by inserting the amenity and other characteristics for each building into Equation
(5). For each unrehabilitated property, the value of zt is set equal to the logarithm
of the ratio of predicted to actual unrehabilitated rents, where the former is
obtained from Equation (4). The resulting value of zt generally tends to be quite
small for newer unrehabilitated buildings, since the observed value of Rui tends to
be relatively large in comparison to the estimated Rri. As expected, properties that
display the highest levels of zt are middle-aged or older properties that have not
yet undergone rehabilitation.
Prior to the estimation of Equation (2), the data are standardized by redeﬁning
the time to rehabilitation as the year of rehabilitation minus 1978, which is the
base year. The age of the structure in 1978 is controlled by one of the regressors
on the right-hand side of Equation (2).9 All properties at the end of 1991 that
were not yet rehabilitated were treated as censored observations. This is essentially
the approach in the literature on unemployment duration and is an advantage of
the Cox model, permitting proper evaluation of the rehabilitation tax credit
hypothesis without assigning an arbitrary date for rehabilitation or assuming
rehabilitation never occurs.
The model in Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
log T    xb  z  
(W  ), (6)Tax Credits and the Boston Office Market  329
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where T is the year of rehabilitation minus 1978,   ln , 
  (1/p), b  (b1,
b2,...,bn), bi  
i,   
, W  ln [ln S(T)],  is an additional error
component added to the model because z happens to be a generated regressor,
and S(T) is the conditional survivor function for the ith property.
Estimation of Equation (6) poses two potentially vexing problems. First, with the
inclusion of z on the RHS of Equation (6), which is estimated and not observed,
the Weibull proportional hazards model has unobserved heterogeneity.
Consequently, Equation (6) cannot be estimated by parametric maximum
likelihood unless enough is known about the distribution of  to specify the
distribution of W   up to ﬁnitely many parameters. Correcting for this problem
is not trivial and involves many tradeoffs. Heckman and Singer (1984a, 1984b)
present a nonparametric maximum likelihood method that does not require
knowledge of the distribution of . Their method produces consistent estimates,
but nothing is known about the rate of convergence or asymptotic distribution, so
it cannot be used for statistical inference. Additionally, the Heckman-Singer
methodology is quite difﬁcult to compute. Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon
(1984a, 1984b) provide necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for consistency and
apply their methodology to basic Poisson models. However, to extend their
technique to the Weibull model at hand would be a separate paper itself. Another
approach (and the one employ employed in this research) is the use of an
instrument such as AGE to proxy for z. The validity of this approach depends, of
course, on the degree of appropriateness of the proxy. The performance of z in
the estimated hazards models will be evaluated, along with its relationship to
various proxies, such as AGE, before making a judgment about the best way to
handle this quasi-maximum likelihood estimation issue.
The second potential problem with estimating Equation (6) is that the standard
errors of b and  need to be adjusted to take into account the random sampling
error in the estimators of Br and Bu, but this is not difﬁcult. This issue is resolved
using the procedure outlined in Murphy and Topel (1985).
 The Explanatory Variables
Following are the xt  (x1t, x2t,...,xnt) variables that were selected for inclusion
in Equation (6):
1. Rehabilitation Tax Credit (). Each structure was evaluated as to the
level of tax credit it would be eligible for as of its date of rehabilitation
(or the end of the sample period for unrehabilitated structures). If the
structure was not eligible for a credit, ‘‘zero’’ was entered. The
rehabilitation tax credit variable is taken directly from the IRS code during
the 1978–1991 observation period. It takes on one of ﬁve values: 10% in
1978–1980 for structures at least 20 years old; either 15% or 20% in
1981–1985 depending on whether the structure is at least 30 to 40 years
old; 10% after 1985 for all properties that were built and originally placed
in service before 1936; and 20% for certiﬁed historic structures.330  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
2. Age of the Structure in 1978 (AGE). AGE is a correlate of the potential
gain from rehabilitation and the marginal cost of rehabilitation. It also
acts in a variety of other ways to potentially affect the rate of
rehabilitation activity, both directly and indirectly. For example, AGE
could be a proxy for unobserved quality differences or historic
architectural characteristics. Of course, the correlation of AGE with other
explanatory variables such as z can result in problems associated with
multicollinearity.
3. Building Size (SQFT). Net rentable area of the building measured in
square feet. This variable and its square are also used as a proxy for the
cost of rehabilitation. There are expected to be economies of scale up to
a point (shortening the time to rehabilitation) and diseconomies beyond
that point.
4. Building Height (FLR). Number of ﬂoors. This variable also serves as a
proxy for the cost of rehabilitation.
5. Locational Submarket (LOC). 0–1 location variables to control for
‘‘neighborhood’’ effects.
6. Rental Volatility (VOL). The standard deviation in metropolitan rent
levels over the previous ﬁve years prior to the censor point or the time
of rehabilitation was calculated and used as a simple proxy for volatility
expectations.10 Increased uncertainty in future rents in an option
framework would be expected to make it advantageous to wait for
additional information before deciding to rehabilitate.
The expected signs on these variables are worth noting. The rehabilitation tax
credit variable should have a negative sign, since larger tax credits should provide
a greater incentive to rehabilitate. This hypothesis is consistent with the model,
in that rehabilitation tax credits are expected to push a project ‘‘over the top’’ and
change it from a negative to a positive net present value project. The coefﬁcient
of AGE depends on the collinearity with z; if, say, AGE is a good instrument for
z, then the coefﬁcient on AGE should be positive. AGE could also increase the
time to rehabilitation, for example, if AGE increases 	t. The coefﬁcient on SQFT
should be positive. Generally, the greater the building size, the higher the cost of
rehabilitation. Additionally, a simultaneous rise in cost is likely to occur with
higher elevations within a given structural class. Hence, FLR should have a
positive coefﬁcient.
The locational submarket variables are included as RHS variables in Equation (6)
to control for neighborhood effects, the thought being that the decision to
rehabilitate any one property depends in part on the district in which the property
is located. Davis and Whinston (1966) recognize this issue with the notion that
individually rational action may not allow for socially desirable investment in the
redevelopment of properties in some neighborhoods (depending on the character
of the neighborhood environment), but may allow it in other neighborhoods. This
is tested below when (t; xt) is examined to see whether or not it is signiﬁcantly
different for different neighborhoods.Tax Credits and the Boston Office Market  331
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Exhibit 3  Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Time to rehab.a 9.29 4.27 0 14
Asking rent $25.85 $6.74 $13.00 $50.00
Vacancy rate 0.17 0.20 11,010 1,589,000
Square feet 226,969 296,858 2 60
Floors 13 10 2 183
Building age (yrs) 59 42 0 1
North Station 0.10 0.30 0 1
Charlestown 0.06 0.24 0 1
Financial District 0.57 0.50 0 1
Fox Point Channel 0.06 0.24 0 1
South Station 0.03 0.17 0 1
Back Bay 0.18 0.39 0 1
Note:
a The base year is 1978.
Finally, the coefﬁcient on VOL should be positive; greater uncertainty in future
rents should make it advantageous to wait for additional information before
deciding to rehabilitate. There is evidence, however, of a strong positive
correlation between VOL and the rehabilitation tax credit ().
 Data
This study is based on a panel survey of the metropolitan Boston ofﬁce market
conducted by Spaulding & Slye Colliers. It covers a sample of 187 ofﬁce buildings
located in the City of Boston. The survey reports year built, year rehabilitated,
asking rents, vacancy rate, building size, number of ﬂoors, and location for each
building (sample statistics are summarized in Exhibit 3).11 The earliest date of
construction for any structure rehabilitated during the time period analyzed here
was 1805, while the latest date was 1969. A substantial portion of the structures
in the sample were built and originally placed in service in the late 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s.
The base year for the analysis is 1978 as it is the beginning year of the tax credit
program. Each ofﬁce building in the ﬁnal sample is followed from 1978 through
the end of 1991 or until the building is rehabilitated, whichever comes ﬁrst. The
effective ‘‘age’’ of an ofﬁce building is considered the time since the last
rehabilitation for those structures indicated to have been rehabilitated prior to332  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
1978. Several structures are indicated to have been rehabilitated more than once,
but none during the sample period.
The number of properties rehabilitated between 1978 and 1991 are shown in
Exhibit 4. The table is divided into two main parts. The ﬁrst part shows the number
of properties rehabilitated in the period 1978–1991 by year built (see columns 1–
14). The second part of the exhibit shows the total number of rehabilitated
properties by year built (column 15), as well as the number of buildings that were
‘‘censored,’’ that is existed as unrehabilitated structures at the end of the
observation period in 1991 (column 16), the total number of properties built and
originally placed in service during each decade (column 17), and ﬁnally the
cumulative total number of properties in the sample that were built during each
decade (column 18).12 Of the 187 ofﬁce buildings in the sample, 114 buildings
were rehabilitated in the 1978–1991 period, while 73 were not. One hundred
eleven of the 187 ofﬁce buildings were eligible for rehabilitation tax credits during
this time period. Of these properties, 108 buildings were rehabilitated in the 1978–
1991 period, while three were not.
The Kaplan-Meier hazard function approach is used to measure the rate of
rehabilitation.13 The Kaplan-Meier hazard is the probability that a property will
be rehabilitated at period t, conditional on the property’s reaching period t without
prior rehabilitation. The natural estimator for this probability is the ratio of the
number of properties rehabilitated at period t divided by the number of total
properties ‘‘at risk’’ at period t. A plot of the Kaplan-Meier hazard is given in
Exhibit 5. As a general rule, in any given year the hazard rates are essentially
zero for buildings less than 20 years old. Thereafter, the sample rates have a
distinct upward slope (particularly for buildings 50 years old or older). Obviously,
in any mid-life or younger building, the additional value created by a rehabilitation
program (either in terms of increased market value or increased income potential)
tends to be quite small. This value generally grows over time as older buildings
become outdated and physically deteriorated.
This data can also be viewed historically. This involves looking at the number of
buildings rehabilitated each year, divided by the number of unrehabilitated
buildings at the beginning of the year. These simple computations yield the results
shown in Exhibit 6. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the unconditional probability
of rehabilitation in the Boston ofﬁce market reaches a peak of about 15% in 1985,
falls to 9% in 1987, and then rises to 16% in 1988. Then from 1988 to 1991, the
probability declines from a peak of 16% to a low of 3%.
These data suggest a strong a priori possibility of a link between rehabilitation
tax credits and rehabilitation activity, particularly over the 1981–1985 period,
when a 15% tax credit was given to structures at least 30 years old and a 20%
tax credit was given to structures at least 40 years old. Prior to that (i.e., from
1978 to 1981), nonresidential buildings at least 20 years old were only given a
10% rehabilitation tax credit. The data also suggest some reduction in
rehabilitation activity in 1986 and subsequent years, coincident with a decline in



























































Exhibit 4  Time to Rehabilitation for Sample Properties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Year Built
Year Rehabilitated







1850 1 1 1 3 1 4 4
1850–1859 1 1 2 2 6
1860–1869 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 12
1870–1879 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 11 11 23
1880–1889 3 2 2 7 7 30
1890–1899 1 5 5 4 1 2 4 1 1 24 24 54
1900–1909 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 5 4 2 1 25 2 27 81
1910–1919 1 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 13 2 15 96
1920–1929 1 1 5 2 2 4 1 1 17 17 113
1930–1939 0 0 113
1940–1949 1 1 2 2 115
1950–1959 1 1 1 116
1960–1969 1 1 1 3 9 12 128
1970–1979 0 19 19 147
1980–1989 0 34 34 181
1990–1991 0 6 6 187
Total 13391 6 11 6 1 8 1 0 91 4 6 6 2 114 73 187
Notes: The table shows the number of ofﬁce buildings in the Boston ofﬁce market by year of construction and year rehabilitated. The sample period is from
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The apparent positive correlation between the rehabilitation tax credit and
rehabilitation activity is not conclusive evidence of a link between the two. A
variety of other factors, including the signiﬁcant increase in real estate tax
depreciation beneﬁts that was brought about by the Economic Recovery Tax Act
(ERTA) of 1981 could account for some of the variation in rehabilitation activity.14
In addition, the decline in rehabilitation activity in the Boston ofﬁce market after
1985 coincides with the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, which signiﬁcantly
reduced the tax beneﬁts from investing in ofﬁce buildings. Finally, in addition to
the changes in tax depreciation beneﬁts over the study period, other covariates
such as changes in after-tax required rates of return could easily explain the
variation in rehabilitation activity over time.
 Estimation Results: Gain from Rehabilitation
Estimates of Equations (4) and (5) are presented in Exhibit 7. The standard errors
of the estimated coefﬁcients are in parentheses. The asking rent data are from the
Spaulding & Slye Colliers panel survey. Mean values of Rrt and Rut are $22.70
and $29.65 per square foot, respectively. Overall, rents in the Boston ofﬁce market
were about $25 per square foot per year in 1990–1991. This compares to an
average market rent (in nominal dollars) of $21 per square foot in 1976–1977,
and about $30 per square foot in 1988 (as reported by the National Real Estate
Index). Between these two periods, average rents per square foot rose almost
monotonically. Then after reaching a peak in 1987–1988, average rents per square
foot fell precipitously.
All the other arguments in the rental hedonic equations were also obtained from
the Spaulding & Slye Colliers panel survey. Interestingly, building vacancy rates
in the Boston ofﬁce market went from about 4.0% to 4.5% in 1980–1981 to over
19% in 1990–1991. By 1987, vacancy rates in the Boston ofﬁce market were
13%. Yet new ofﬁce construction continued to take place. There is some recent
evidence to suggest that part of this investment activity was due to irrational and
faddish behavior (e.g., Mei and Saunders, 1995). There also is evidence that some
markets are prone to pronounced bursts of development activity following a fall
in demand (as happened in the Boston ofﬁce market during the mid to late-1980s),
and that such behavior is entirely rational given the possibility of preemptive
equilibria (see Grenadier, 1996).
The Spaulding & Slye Colliers survey identiﬁes six distinct submarkets within the
Boston ofﬁce market. These include North Station, which is adjacent to the old
Boston Garden; Charlestown, which is across the river and includes Old Cove,
the site of Bunker Hill; the Financial District, which includes Quincy Market; Fort
Port Channel, which is the old district of Boston; South Station, which includes
the Federal Reserve Bank; and Back Bay, which includes Copely Square. Earlier
work by Vandell and Lane (1989) on essentially the same data set as the current
study ﬁnds a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between distance to the cityTax Credits and the Boston Office Market  337
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Exhibit 7  Rental Hedonic Estimations for Use in Estimating the Gain from Rehabilitation (z) for
Rehabilitated and Unrehabilitated Buildings

















Fox Point Channel 0.2324** 0.2711**
(0.0746) (0.1309)
South Station 0.1340 0.0049
(0.0941) (0.1785)
Back Bay 0.0330 0.0316
(0.0508) (0.0626)
Adj. R2 0.107 0.559
F-Value 2.21** 9.16***
Dependent Mean 3.122 (log $22.70) 3.390 (log $29.65)
Notes: The dependent variable is log Rent. For rehabilitated buildings, N  101; for
unrehabilitated buildings, N  58. Adjusted standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
center and asking rents in the Boston ofﬁce market. The locational submarket
indicator variables should pick up this effect.
The ordinary least squares rental hedonic results listed in Exhibit 7 explain 11%
and 56% respectively of the cross-sectional variation in rents. Multicollinearity
among several of the explanatory variables explains some of the insigniﬁcance of
the coefﬁcients (for example, size and number of ﬂoors). The AGE variable is
highly signiﬁcant in explaining rents for unrehabilitated buildings, with each year338  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
of age reducing rents by 0.8%. As expected, AGE is insigniﬁcant for rehabilitated
buildings. Unrehabilitated buildings in the North Station and Fox Point Channel
submarkets are found to experience signiﬁcantly lower rents, about 25% lower,
than those in the Financial District (the left-out category). This holds true also for
rehabilitated buildings in the Fox Point Channel submarket, about 23% lower.
Other submarket rents are insigniﬁcantly different from those of the Financial
District, but the negative sign on most coefﬁcients suggests that the Financial
District tends to possess the highest rents in the market for both rehabilitated and
unrehabilitated structures.
A variable indicating the log of the time (in years) since rehabilitation was
included in the rehabilitated building hedonic model to control for subsequent
adjustments in rent due to subsequent depreciation. The coefﬁcient on this variable
was negative, as expected, though insigniﬁcant. Although positive coefﬁcients on
the size of the building and number of ﬂoors variables were positive, as expected,
they were insigniﬁcant.
The vacancy rate effect was not consistent or signiﬁcant, although the expectation
for this variable could vary depending on whether it is a proxy for a rent level
diverging from equilibrium (in which case higher vacancies mean higher rents) or
for unobserved quality differences (in which case higher vacancies mean lower
quality, hence lower rents). If the explanatory variable values for SQFT, FLR,
VACRATE are set, and the submarket indicators are set at the mean of the entire
sample of buildings and ‘‘zero’’ is inserted for time since rehabilitation, a 40-year-
old unrehabilitated building (AGE  40) would rent for $22.45 per square,
whereas if rehabilitated, it would rent for $29.40 per square foot, a 31% premium.
These rent estimates are used, along with the reported actual rental rates from the
Spaulding & Slye Colliers panel survey, to determine the potential gain from
rehabilitation before the tax credit for each building in the sample.15 Exhibit 8 is
a scatter diagram illustrating the relationship of these gain estimates and structure
age for the sample of unrehabilitated and rehabilitated structures. As expected, the
gain from rehabilitation generally rises from zero or negative levels for newer
structures below about 25 years old (most of which were unrehabilitated) to as
high as 50% to 100%, or even more, for older structures of 100 years of age or
more. It appears that the critical age of a building to render rehabilitation feasible
from an economic standpoint is between 25 and 50 years, consistent with the
observed Kaplan-Meier hazard function results in Exhibit 5.
 Estimation Results: Hazard Model
Exhibit 9 shows estimates of the proportional hazards model for the full sample
(adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses).16 To evaluate the effects
of multicollinearity, a simple model of time to rehabilitation is estimated as a
function of the gain from rehabilitation without any other control variables. The
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Intercept 2.82*** 3.28*** 3.36***
(0.11) (0.28) (0.26)
Gain from rehabilitation 1.00*** 0.23***
(0.27) (0.20)








Age of Building in 1978
Greater than 50, but less than 75 0.92** 0.86***
(0.31) (0.31)
Greater than 75, but less than 100 0.87*** 0.79***
(0.41) (0.37)
Greater than 100 1.08*** 0.96**
(0.18) (0.39)




Fox Point Channel 0.10 0.10
(0.17) (0.17)
South Station 0.04 0.05
(0.27) (0.22)
Back Bay 0.03 0.02
(0.13) (0.12)
Scale 0.54 0.40 0.40
0.05 (0.03) (0.03)
Log-likelihood 149.8 89.2 89.9
Notes: The dependent variable is time to rehabilitation. For the whole sample, regression
coefﬁcients and adjusted standard errors (N  187); there are 41 missing observations. Adjusted
standard errors are in parentheses.
** Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.Tax Credits and the Boston Office Market  341
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building, age of the building in 1978, and ﬁve 0-1 location variables is added to
the model in the second column. In the third column, gain from rehabilitation is
dropped from the equation and the model is re-estimated with the other
explanatory variables.
The results in column 1 of Exhibit 9 show that the gain from rehabilitation before
the tax credit has the predicted negative sign. The coefﬁcient of gain from
rehabilitation is 1.00, and, with an adjusted standard error of 0.27, it is
statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of signiﬁcance.
Adding AGE to the regression, however, signiﬁcantly reduces explanatory power
and the signiﬁcance of the gain variable z. In column 2 of Exhibit 9, the t-Statistic
for the coefﬁcient of the gain variable changes from 3.70 to 1.15, which is
attributable to the high positive correlation between gain from rehabilitation and
building age (the correlation is 0.85).17
The rehabilitation tax credit variable, on the other hand, takes its predicted sign
and is highly signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient is 2.99 and is relatively tightly
estimated. The coefﬁcient of the rehabilitation tax credit suggests that an increase
in the rehabilitation tax credit of 10 percentage points would lead to a reduction
in time to rehabilitation of 30%.
With signiﬁcance levels of 8% (building size) and 20% (squared building size)
respectively, some support for a nonlinear relationship between building size and
time to rehabilitation is found. The relationship between building size and time
to rehabilitation reaches a minimum at 1 million square feet, beyond which any
further increase in building size has the effect of increasing the time to
rehabilitation. Since this is near the largest building size in the sample, this means
that most buildings are indeed on the negative sloping side of this curve.
Therefore, an increase in building size reduces time to rehabilitation, except for
very large buildings, where the impact is reversed.
Number of ﬂoors enters the regression with a positive sign, indicating that as the
number of ﬂoors increases, time to rehabilitation increases as expected. The three
0-1 indicator variables for age of the structure in 1978 are negative and highly
signiﬁcant. As building age increases, time to rehabilitation decreases.
The ﬁve 0-1 indicator variables for location are a disappointment. The data do not
support different rates of rehabilitation across different neighborhoods or market
areas, which is somewhat unexpected. The coefﬁcients of the 0-1 indicator
variables for location are generally insigniﬁcant, except for Charleston where the
coefﬁcient is positive and weakly signiﬁcant. Since there is a high correlation
between the submarket indicators and the z variable, there may be multicollinearity
problems here.
In column 3 of Exhibit 9, the estimators are slightly better in the sense of having
smaller mean square error, than the estimators in column 2. There are two reasons
for this. First, dropping the gain variable and using AGE as an instrument for z342  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
eliminates a generated regressor on the RHS of the equation, which eliminates the
issue of unobserved heterogeneity in the model. Second, using the AGE variable
in column 3 eliminates the high correlation between gain from rehabilitation and
building age, which permits a more accurate estimation of the building age effect.
The results in column 3 also provide slightly better predictors from the model
than those from the model estimated in column 2. Finally, comparing the results
in columns 2 and 3, it can be seen that most of the coefﬁcients in the latter
equation are essentially unchanged. In particular, the coefﬁcient of the
rehabilitation tax credit changes only slightly, from 2.99 in column 2 to 2.97
in column 3. For these reasons (and since this research is mainly interested in
prediction), the results in column 3 are preferred over those in column 2.
Regressions of time to rehabilitation were also performed on the control variables
including the measure of the volatility in rent. Unfortunately, volatility in rent was
highly correlated with the rehabilitation tax credit variable. Adding volatility in
rent to the regression model resulted in a negative and highly signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient, indicating, counter intuitively, that the higher the volatility in rent, the
higher is the probability of rehabilitation. Also, by adding volatility in rent to the
model, it is not surprising that the signiﬁcance of the rehabilitation tax credit
disappeared.
Other variables were also experimented with (e.g., vacancy rates), and while some
of these variables were signiﬁcant predictors of rehabilitation activity, the
estimates of the other coefﬁcients were not materially altered. In particular, the
coefﬁcient of the tax credit variable was robust.
 Policy Simulations
Even though the determinants of rehabilitation activity are not easy to unravel,
the ﬁndings to this point have generally been expected in the sense that it is hard
to believe that rehabilitation tax credits do not inﬂuence rehabilitation activity
(and, perhaps, the amount of spending) in some manner. A more debatable set of
issues arises as the focus shifts to the issue of slippage (i.e., the share of tax-credit
investment spending that is spending that would have been invested otherwise).
To assess the degree of slippage associated with the rehabilitation tax credit,
simulation analysis is applied to the proportional hazards regression model
estimated above. While the focus is on column 3, in Exhibit 9, the full
speciﬁcation of the model without the gain from rehabilitation, the results are
quite robust. The model is simulated twice: ﬁrst assuming all exogenous variables
take on their actual values (the ‘‘control simulation’’), and then assuming the value
of the rehabilitation tax credit is replaced with zeros. Simulated probabilities of
rehabilitation for each property are then averaged across all properties at each
point in time. The results are then plotted in Exhibit 10. All calculations begin in
1978 and run forward to the end of 1991.
The simulations in Exhibit 10 offer several important insights. Notice ﬁrst that,
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(Annual Fraction of Buildings that Would Have Been Rehabilitated in the Absence of the Rehabilitation Tax Credit
to the Fraction of Buildings That Would Have Been Rehabilitated Under the Control Simulation)
increasing in the 1979–1985 time period, and generally decreasing thereafter. The
rise in the probability of rehabilitation during the 1978–1985 time period may
reﬂect the increase in the rehabilitation tax credit during this period, while the fall
in the probability of rehabilitation thereafter may reﬂect the fact that rehabilitation
tax credits were reduced in 1986. However, this pattern may also reﬂect other
factors such as increased, then decreased expectations of gain, or sample
selectivity bias as the remaining population of buildings ripe for redevelopment
dwindles.
Turning to the issue of slippage, the simulation results in Exhibit 11 suggest that
during the 1978–1980 time period, roughly 75% of the rehabilitation tax credit
was dissipated on investors who would have invested anyway (as measured by the
ratio of the fraction of buildings that were predicted to be rehabilitated in the
absence of the rehabilitation tax credit to the fraction of buildings that would have
been rehabilitated under the control simulation).18 On the other hand, in the 1981–
1985 time period, the results suggest that only 60% to 65% of the rehabilitation
tax credit was dissipated on investors who would have invested anyway. This
ﬁgure increases to roughly 90% in the 1986–1991 period. Thus, moving
chronologically through the time period analyzed here, the degree of dissipation
generally starts out fairly high, then decreases, only to increase thereafter. These
results are entirely consistent with theoretical expectations. They conﬁrm the fact
that signiﬁcant slippage does occur. They also suggest that such slippage can be
compounded (and tax credits rendered increasingly less effective) as the remaining
population of buildings that are potential candidates for rehabilitation dwindles.
The ultimate question is whether the tax credit increases or merely accelerates the
level of rehabilitation. The high degree of slippage in the late 1980s as theTax Credits and the Boston Office Market  345
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population of eligible buildings declines suggests the latter to be primarily the
case, but a thorough evaluation of this issue depends on a competing risks
framework that also considers the decision to demolish, as well as to rehabilitate.
Such a framework is not a part of the current analysis.
 Conclusion
In this work, evidence is presented in a new but obvious way that demonstrates
that rehabilitation tax credits have important effects on the timing of rehabilitation
decisions as expected. Evidence is also presented that suggests that a signiﬁcant
portion of rehabilitation tax credit investment spending is spending that would
have been invested otherwise. This portion, however, is lower in high tax credit
regimes ceteris paribus. These latter ﬁndings have not been fully considered or
looked at by the previous literature on investment tax credits.
The evidence is generally supportive of the view that a higher expected gain from
rehabilitation leads to higher rates of rehabilitation. However, the speciﬁcation of
gain from rehabilitation is measured with errors. It is also, by deﬁnition, highly
correlated with building age. In response to these problems, two models of the
time to rehabilitation are estimated: one that includes gain from rehabilitation and
building age (plus other RHS variables), and one without gain from rehabilitation
(but including building age plus other RHS variables). A model conditional only
on the gain from rehabilitation is also estimated to study the sensitivity of
estimates of the coefﬁcients to different speciﬁcations.
Although perhaps obvious, it is worth stressing that the relationship between time
to rehabilitation and building age ought to be fairly strong. There are numerous
reasons for expecting this. Empirically, the results presented above generally
conﬁrm the expectation that building age is a critical determinant of time to
rehabilitation, with the sign as expected.
It also is interesting that neighborhood inﬂuences are generally insigniﬁcant. This
result runs contrary to argument of Davis and Whinston (1966), and others;
however, it too may be affected by collinearity with the gain and age variables.
In closing, there are some limitations to the results. First, the focus alone on the
level of rents (as well as vacancy rates) is not meant to deny that other economic
factors such as ofﬁce employment growth can have signiﬁcant effects on
rehabilitation activity. For the present, the data simply do not encompass these
other factors (other than implicitly through the market rents). In addition, an
important assumption associated with the use of proportional hazards models is
that all hazard rates should be time-separable. Obviously, to the extent that
externalities or interdependencies between property values and neighborhood
characteristics exist, and are reﬂected in the return on rehabilitation, this
assumption may be violated. Finally, it can be argued that the treatment of
censored observations is clearly critical to the results (particularly given the
correlation between building age and right censorship).346  Shilling, Vandell, Koesman, and Lin
 Endnotes
1 This is a restriction from prior law. Prior to TRA 1986, the credit extended to structures
at least 30 years old.
2 For a survey of this literature, see Gravelle (1993).
3 Consider the work of Hendershott and Hu (1981), for example, who conclude that the
cost of capital (and, hence, any investment tax credit) has a signiﬁcant and substantial
inﬂuence on investment in producers’ equipment. However, this conclusion seems
overstated because in their ﬁnal set of estimated equations, the cost-of-capital variables
generally lose their statistical signiﬁcance. A part of the problem may stem from
aggregation bias or measurement error. Another issue concerns the high degree of
collinearity between the cost of capital and capacity utilization, which in fact is evident
as soon as capacity utilization is entered as a regressor.
4 Note that this does not imply that the only beneﬁciaries of the tax credit are those
owners of older structures who would have rehabilitated their structures anyway. All
owners of structures can eventually beneﬁt from the credit as their properties age, their
marginal revenue curves shift upward, and rehabilitation becomes efﬁcient. The increase
in consumer surplus for owners of property of age ai due to the credit is the increase
in the area between the marginal revenue curve MRi in Exhibit 1 and the marginal cost
curve from no credit (MC0) to the appropriate credit level MCj. Of course, none of this
analysis considers what is often cited as the primary social beneﬁt of the credit, namely
the positive externality effects of eliminating blighted structures.
5 In fact, in continuous time, structures would be expected to be rehabilitated at exactly
that time in which the marginal revenue curve shifts upward and outward just sufﬁciently
to cross the relevant marginal cost curve. At that point, the equilibrium level of
rehabilitation q* is deﬁned by the point of crossover, where the excess proﬁts generated
from the rehabilitation are exactly equal to zero. In the real world, however, one must
be concerned with the fact that the rehabilitation tax credit is permitted only for qualiﬁed
structures that have been substantially rehabilitated. This requirement means that
investors might postpone rehabilitation into the future until the time when the cost of
renovating qualiﬁes for the rehabilitation tax credit.
6 Note that if p  1, then there is no aging in (t), which means that rehabilitation is a
random event (and the expected time to rehabilitation for a building having survived to
t remains the same, independent of t). However, if p  1, then (t) will either increase
or decrease with time, which means that the rate of rehabilitation per unit of time should
either increase or decrease depending on whether p  1o rp  1.
7 To conﬁrm expectations of the superiority of the Weibull speciﬁcation, the hazard
function was also estimated assuming a log-normal and exponential baseline hazard
function. Although the log-normal model performed comparably to the Weibull, the
exponential model was clearly inferior from the standpoint of maximizing the log-
likelihood function.
8 Both market and individual property vacancy rates are actually relevant in that they
indicate both the tightness of the market overall and the tightness of the individual
property relative to the market. However, the high degree of collinearity mandated use
of only one, the property rate, which seemed to provide the most meaningful results.
9 In the case of the few (2) buildings renovated before 1978, ‘‘effective age’’ was used,
deﬁned as the time since rehabilitation. The expected effect of age on time to
rehabilitation is discussed below.Tax Credits and the Boston Office Market  347
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10 Metropolitan level annual ofﬁce rental data were taken from the National Real Estate
Index.
11 Rehabilitation is not explicitly deﬁned in the survey, but is assumed to involve a
substantial capital investment, which is intended to bring the structure up to its optimal
level of economic productivity (i.e., where marginal revenue  marginal cost).
12 No structures were demolished during the observation period.
13 For details see Keifer (1988).
14 However, it is also signiﬁcant that the depreciable basis of a property is reduced by the
amount of the rehabilitation tax credit. Also, the rehabilitation tax credit is permitted
only for qualiﬁed structures that have been substantially rehabilitated, and which retain
at least 75% of the existing external walls. The credit itself is limited to those
expenditures directly associated with the rehabilitation; costs of acquisition or
enlargement of such properties are not recognized expenses. See present IRS Code 47.
15 Gain ‘‘before the tax credit’’ is used because the percentage rental increase is estimated
before any consideration for the additional gain represented by the tax credit.
16 As discussed earlier, the standard errors have been adjusted according to the procedure
outlined in Murphy and Topel (1985) to take into account the incremental random
sampling error caused by the estimation, rather than the direct observation, of the gain
z.
17 The multicollinearity between the gain variable and AGE of course is not unexpected,
given that the gain variable incorporated rent estimates that themselves were based upon
AGE in the hazard equation.
18 It is worth noting that simulations were also undertaken for the full hazard model in
column 2. Results were comparable to those undertaken for the model in column 3 with
AGE but without the gain variable.
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